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Abstract: Under present conditions of economic globalization, social-ecolog-
ical systems undergo rapid changes. In this context, internal and external forces 
put heavy pressure on the governance systems of commons to adapt effectively. 
While institutional learning has been identified as a key element for the adap-
tive governance of social-ecological systems, there is still limited knowledge of 
what roles communities and governmental actors play in these processes. In this 
study, we take the case of yarshagumba (English: caterpillar fungus), a formerly 
non-valued product in the Himalayas, which has recently been transformed into 
a highly valuable resource within a short time. We compare the governance sys-
tems in collection sites in the Kailash Landscape in India and Nepalby using an 
analytical framework developed by Pahl-Wostl. Our findings show that in these 
remote mountain areas, communities and community-led organizations are highly 
flexible in responding to immediate resource value changes by establishing com-
munal management arrangements. At the same time, however, communities have 
difficulties to enforce their newly developed informal and formal arrangements. 
During the process of learning the link between the amendment of arrangements 
on community-level and the revision of formal policies and frames at the state 
or national level is only partly established. Against this background, we argue 
that in the context of rapid change, adaptive governance requires the concerted 
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 interaction of actors at the local and the national levels in order to enable the sus-
tainable use of common pool natural resources.
Keywords: Access rights, adaptive governance of commons, Himalaya, learning, 
ophiocordyceps sinensis
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1. Introduction: yarshagumba – a highly valuable resource
“Let them [the authorities] say whatever they say, we are going for collec-
tion.” (Woman from Pangla, India, April 2017 – English translation, original 
language Hindi)
Most of the high alpine grasslands in the Himalayas of Nepal and India are still 
used as summer pastures for livestock grazing (Bauer 2004). Traditionally, these 
pastures have been common properties governed by communities through local 
committees, guided by social norms, common beliefs and socially and cultur-
ally shared understandings (Herrera et al. 2014; Pandey et al. 2017). In the late 
1990s, Ophiocordyceps sinensis (English: caterpillar fungus; locally known as 
yarshagumba1), a highly valuable product, was discovered on these grasslands 
at altitudes between 3000 and 5200 m (Winkler 2009; Shrestha and Bawa 2013, 
2014). Caterpillar fungus is collected by hundreds of thousands of people in the 
Himalayas of India, Nepal and Bhutan each year and traded by middlemen as a 
medicinal product, mainly to China (Shrestha and Bawa 2013; Baral et al. 2015).
1 In Tibetan language yarshagumba is called yartsa gunbu, which means ‘winter worm – summer 
grass’ (Winkler 2008). Yarshagumba is an endoparasitic complex formed by the fungus ophio-
cordyceps sinensis and the host larva of different moth species (Negi et al. 2016). For more details on 
the biology and usage of yarshagumba see Winkler (2008) and Negi et al. (2016).
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In the late 1990s the demand on the Chinese market for yarshagumba trans-
formed fundamentally, leading to a tremendous rise in prices (Winkler 2008; 
Yeh and Lama 2013). The high prices for yarshagumba and the perceived easy 
cash income opportunity for locals triggered a ‘gold rush’ in the Himalayan 
Mountains. The sudden run of collectors to the yarshagumba collection sites led 
to conflicts about access and uncontrolled usage of the resource (Negi et al. 2006; 
Shrestha and Bawa 2013). Especially collectors from distant villages, hereafter 
called “distant collectors,” have exacerbated the pressures on the social-ecolog-
ical systems (Pant et al. 2017). Over the last decades the governance systems 
in these high alpine areas where yarshagumba is collected, have struggled to 
adapt to these changes and to set up and enforce management mechanisms for 
its sustainable collection (Cannon et al. 2009; Negi et al. 2006; Winkler 2009; 
Weckerle et al. 2010; Childs and Choedup 2014; Baral et al. 2015). Today, the 
collection is influenced by governance systems consisting of both formal govern-
mental institutions and informal communal management arrangements (Cannon 
et al. 2009; Weckerle et al. 2010; Childs and Choedup 2014; Negi et al. 2015; 
Caplins 2016; Pant et al. 2017).
This development in the Himalayan Mountains brings up the question of how 
actors and institutions in remote areas govern commons when rapid changes in the 
social-ecological system occur. Over the last decade scientists identified adaptive 
governance and learning processes as essential elements for governing social-
ecological systems during periods of abrupt change (Dietz et al. 2003; Folke 
et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl 2009; Plummer et al. 2013; Karpouzoglou et al. 2016). 
However, they note, “our knowledge about resource governance systems and how 
they change [to deal with present and future challenges] is [still] quite limited” 
(Pahl-Wostl 2009, 254).
Contributing to this on-going research area, we focus our analysis on the 
adaptive capacity and learning processes of resource governance systems in 
remote mountain areas using the case of yarshagumba collection. We compare 
resource governance systems in the collection sites of two settings in the Kailash 
Landscape2: in the Kumaon region of Uttarakhand State in India and in the adja-
cent protected area of the Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA) in Nepal. These 
two regions differ in terms of both legal and social context. In India, the com-
mercial collection of yarshagumba is legal only in community forests managed 
by van panchayats (community forest councils) with the approval of the State 
Forest Department (Uttarakhand Biodiversity Board 2017). However, collectors 
harvest yarshagumba wherever possible – within state forests or protected areas – 
 regardless of property rights and legal status (Negi et al. 2016). In Nepal, in con-
trast, yarshagumba collection and sale in all community forests and conservation 
2 The Kailash Landscape comprises a transboundary region of Uttarakhand State, India, Pulan 
County, China and parts of far western Nepal. The landscape is part of an initiative steered and im-
plemented by the governments of China, India and Nepal and the International Centre for Integrated 
Mountain Development (ICIMOD).
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areas is legal (MoFSC 2017), but conflicts regarding access between villagers and 
distant collectors are common (ICIMOD 2015; Pant et al. 2017).
While comparing different resource governance systems we aim to under-
stand how these systems respond to a rapid increase in the economic value of 
an available resource. The two types of systems we compare are (1) formal gov-
ernmental institutions and (2) communal management arrangements, which con-
sist of both formal committees composed of community members, and informal 
arrangements based on a variety of norms, and both of which are essentially com-
munity-led. Further, we ask what strategies governments and communities use to 
protect or gain access to these resources. We focus our case study on the following 
research questions: What developments can be identified in the institutional set-
tings and the management mechanism in areas where yarshagumba is collected? 
What are the learning process of governmental actors, communities and formal 
and informal institutions, and how do these influence each other in the process 
of adapting to rapid changes in the high alpine grasslands of India and Nepal? 
Based on these questions we formulate the following hypothesis: When the eco-
nomic value of a common resource in a remote mountain area increases and other 
changes are subsequently triggered, communities are relatively more flexible in 
adapting their management of the common resource than government authorities, 
irrespective of the legal setting of the area.
We apply the analytical framework of Pahl-Wostl (2009) for analysing the 
adaptive capacity and learning processes in resource governance systems, which 
is further elaborated in Section 2. Section 3 provides details about the study area 
and the data collection and analysis. The analysis of the changes in the governance 
systems in India and Nepal where yarshagumba is collected, namely, the formal 
and informal institutions, the involved state and non-state actors and the multi-
level interactions and integration is presented in Section 4. Further, in Sections 5 
and 6, we analyse and discuss the roles of governments and communities during 
learning processes for adapting to rapidly changing conditions and, finally, draw 
our conclusions.
2. Conceptual framework
Most natural resources, like forests and grazing grounds, are common pool 
resources (Acheson 2006). Common pool resources, like yarshagumba, are sub-
tractable, which means the resource consumed by one person cannot be used 
by another. Secondly, it can be difficult to exclude other people from using the 
resource (Ostrom 1990). It is rational for everyone to free ride on the efforts and 
costs of others when incentives for sustainable usage are lacking (Ostrom 1990; 
Agrawal 2003; Ostrom 2005). This collective-action problem applies also to the 
collection of yarshagumba in the high alpine grasslands. The solution to sustain-
ably managing such a common pool resource is to establish rules curtailing the 
resource access and use (Dietz et al. 2003; Acheson 2006).
Governing the yarshagumba ‘gold rush’ 459
Social-ecological systems are dynamic. Changes within or outside social-eco-
logical systems demand constant adaptation and proper responses by actors and 
institutions (Young 2009). Sudden changes can be triggered by external factors, 
such as changes in market demands or the emergence of new actors, as well as 
internal factors, such as a change of power relations between actors or overlap-
ping institutions (Anderies et al. 2004). Often changes trigger other changes or 
reinforce each other (Young 2009). In our case the price increase of yarshagumba 
in the Himalayas has modified access demands of governmental actors, commu-
nity members and distant collectors, which has further triggered power struggles 
and conflicts between actors.
The search for the governance system best suited to maintaining the sustain-
ability of resources within dynamic social-ecological systems has been under 
discussion for many years, whether local-level management, government regula-
tions or private property rights (Hardin 1968; Ostrom 1990; Baland and Platteau 
1996; Dietz et al. 2003; Folke et al. 2005; Acheson 2006; Pahl-Wostl 2009). 
Governmental actors, especially in remote areas, are likely to face challenges 
regarding the enforcement of regulations due to limited human and financial 
resources or resentments by holders of customary rights (Acheson 2006). Private 
property does not play a role in our case study. Dietz et al. (2003) argue that local 
communities could manage common pool resources effectively, but they usually 
have challenges when sudden changes occur. Often, the change in demand and 
increased value of local resources overstrain the ability of local institutions to 
regulate the resource use in a sustainable way. Communities usually have dif-
ficulties applying sanctions and enforcing communal arrangements outside their 
closed community structure (Ostrom 2010).
In the last decades, researchers have argued for more complex governance 
systems such as ‘adaptive co-management’ and ‘adaptive governance’ (Dietz et al. 
2003; Folke et al. 2005; Olsson et al. 2006; Plummer et al. 2013; Karpouzoglou 
et al. 2016), ‘polycentric institutions’ (Ostrom 2005) or ‘hybrid institutions’ 
(German and Keeler 2010). These approaches have in common the idea that, for 
governance to be effective, it “should employ mixtures of institutional types that 
employ a variety of decision rules to change incentives, increase information, 
monitor use and induce compliance” (Dietz et al. 2003, 1910). They differ in 
terms of setting the priorities of governance structures and in the criteria they use 
to evaluate the performance of governance systems for sustainability of commons 
(Agrawal 2003; Karpouzoglou et al. 2016; Sharma-Wallace et al. 2018).
Governance systems that negotiate and share rights, responsibilities and 
power among different levels and sectors of government and civil society are 
assumed to encourage innovation, learning, adaptation and cooperation among 
actors to deal with unexpected changes (Folke et al. 2005; Huitema et al. 2009; 
Pahl-Wostl 2009; Young 2009; Ostrom 2010; Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013; Sharma-
Wallace et al. 2018). Adaptive capacity is defined as the “ability of a resource 
governance system to first alter processes and if required convert structural ele-
ments as a response to experienced or expected changes in the societal or natural 
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 environment”  (Pahl-Wostl 2009, 355). Learning is considered to be “an explor-
atory, stepwise search process where actors experiment with innovation until 
they meet constraints and new boundaries” (Pahl-Wostl 2009, 358). The adaptive 
capacity of governance systems determines the learning processes and develop-
ments of institutions when sudden changes occur.
Pahl-Wostl (2009) developed an analytical framework to analyse different 
stages of societal learning in resource governance systems. Different from other 
analytical frameworks related to resource governance, such as the Institutional 
Analysis and Development Framework (McGinnis 2011; Binder et al. 2013), 
Pahl-Wostl (2009) focuses specifically on the adaptive capacity and learning 
 processes in resource governance systems in response to changes. Her framework 
helps to analyse developments and learning processes within systems over time. 
Therefore, her approach will be used to analyse and compare resource governance 
systems and the associated learning processes in our study.
These multi-level and multi-loop learning processes range from incremental 
learning (single-loop learning) to structural change (triple-loop learning). Single-
loop learning refers to a gradual improvement of actions towards a strategic goal 
without questioning the underlying assumptions. Double-loop learning refers to 
a reflection of assumptions, for example about cause-effect relationships within 
a value-normative framework. In triple-loop learning, one begins to reconsider 
underlying values and beliefs to transform the context within which the governance 
system is embedded. Keck (2016) calls this transformative capacity. Triple-loop 
learning implies a transformation by changing the strategic goals and regulatory 
frameworks rather than optimizing adaptation strategies. Adaptive change remains 
largely within the reigning paradigm and structural context set by the formal policy 
process. Thus, adaptive change processes are within single and double-loop learn-
ing (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013).
Pahl-Wostl (2009) has identified elements of governance systems that are 
key for these learning processes including institutions and actors, the relation-
ship of state and non-state actors, the multi-level interactions across administra-
tive boundaries and vertical integration, and the governance modes distinguishing 
bureaucratic hierarchies, networks and markets. The interplay of these elements 
determines the adaptive capacity of governance systems to alter processes and 
structures (Pahl-Wostl et al. 2013). This leads us to a comparative analysis of 
roles of communities and governmental actors in learning processes when sudden 
changes occur, using the case of yarshagumba collection in remote Himalayan 
regions of India and Nepal.
3. Study sites and methods
3.1. Study sites
The Kailash Landscape is one of the main areas of Nepal and India from which yar-
shagumba is collected. According to official national data, the conservation area 
ANCA in Nepal provides amounts of between 629 and 954 kg of  yarshagumba 
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annually (ANCA 2018 unpublished). The total harvest in the adjacent Kumaon 
Region, Uttarakhand State, India, amounts to around 350 to 600 kg per year (Negi 
et al. 2016). The study area map (Figure 1) shows the potential habitat of yarsh-
agumba in the Kailash Landscape (total area approximately 1129 square metres)3.
In the Kailash Landscape, two ethnic groups are predominant: the Rang com-
munity, who in Nepal are known as the Shauka, located in the upper parts of the 
Johar, Darma (India) and Mahakali valley (Nepal), and the Hindu community, 
located in the Chameylia valley (Nepal) and in the lower parts of Darma val-
ley (India). The Rang/Shauka community traditionally practices transhumance. 
Over centuries, they have established strict customary laws to regulate access to 
and usage of their pasture areas (Hoon 1996; Leder 2003), which are now yarsh-
agumba collection sites.
3 We calculated the potential habitat for yarshagumba in the Kailash Landscape using as basis the 
land cover layer of high alpine grasslands of the Kailash Sacred Landscape vegetation map (ICIMOD 
2017), adding the criteria of precipitation (250 to 450mm), slope degree (0 to 15 degrees) and height 
(3200 to 5000masl) referring to the listed criteria for determining yarshagumba growth in Negi et al. 
(2015). Inaccuracy of data is possible.
Figure 1: Map of study area and potential yarshagumba habitat (own source, based on ICIMOD 
(2017)).
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Table 1: Characteristics of the surveyed collection sites.
Location  Key characteristics of the collection site
India  
 Bona – Johar valley   – Site located within state forest
 – Traditional grazing institutions
 – Closed site – access exclusively for selected community members 
(Rang community)
  Baling – upper Darma 
valley
  – Site located within community managed forest
 – Traditional grazing institutions
 – Closed site – access exclusively for selected community members 
(Rang community)
  Tejum – lower Darma 
valley
  – Site located within state forest
 – Closed site – access exclusively for selected community members 
(mixed community of Hindus and Rang)
Nepal  
  Api – upper Mahakali 
valley
  – Site located within community managed forest and protected area 
ANCA
 – Traditional grazing institutions
 – Closed site – access exclusively for selected community members 
(Shauka community)
  Buddhi – upper Mahakali 
valley
  – Site located within community managed forest and protected area 
ANCA
 – Open site – access not restricted (mainly Hindu community from 
various villages)
  Kuntison – upper 
Mahakali valley
  – Site located within community managed forest and protected area 
ANCA
 – Closed site – access exclusively for selected community members 
(Shauka community)
  Lolu – Chameylia valley   – Site located within protected area ANCA
 – Open site – access not restricted (mainly Hindu community from 
various villages)
Over the last decade, the rising market price of yarshagumba has influ-
enced and changed the livelihood strategies of the majority of communities 
in the high Himalayan Mountains (Childs and Choedup 2014; Shrestha and 
Bawa 2014; Shrestha et al. 2017). Today, according to a recent study in ANCA 
(Nepal) the “average household cash income from O. sinensis is USD 2174 
[…] confirming the dominant role of O. sinensis in cash generation“ (Pouliot 
et al. 2018, 65).
The empirical fieldwork was conducted in four valleys of the Kailash 
Landscape: in two valleys in the Kumaon Region (India) – Darma and Johar val-
leys – and two valleys of ANCA (Nepal) – Mahakali and Chameylia valleys, 
(see Figure 1). The selection of the study areas is based on different existing 
 institutional settings, property rights and management systems in the yarshagumba 
collection sites. Individual sites are very remote, therefore the  accessibility of the 
sites additionally had to be considered. Using these criteria we chose seven col-
lection sites in four valleys for our case study: Bona, Baling and Tejum in India 
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and Api, Buddhi, Kuntison and Lolu in Nepal (see Table 1 for details about the 
characteristics of each site).
3.2. Data collection and analysis
The empirical research is comprised of qualitative data collected through key 
informant and in-depth interviews, focus group discussions and participatory 
field observation. The interviewees included government officials on central, state 
and district levels, local leaders, community members, traders, collectors from 
various backgrounds with different gender and age and relevant researchers from 
the region. In total 20 interviews with representatives of higher authorities, like 
national and state departments, were conducted. Additionally, 30 representatives 
of local authorities, like van panchayats and ANCA Conservation Committees, 
and 62 community members were interviewed and 13 focus group discussions 
with community members and traders were organised in 2016 and 2017 (Table 2). 
The interviews and focus group discussions were mainly conducted at the collec-
tion sites or in nearby villages. Both men and women come for collection to the 
sites. However, fewer women were interviewed because they were more reluctant 
to answer questions and speak with outsiders.
As some aspects, like negative implications of government regulations or 
social conflicts between different community groups, are considered sensitive and 
difficult to discuss openly with interviewees, participatory field observation was 
used as an important method for building trust between the interviewer and com-
munity members. Additionally, several policies, guidelines and directives of India 
and Nepal guiding natural resource management and non-timber forest product 
(NTFP) collection and trade were reviewed.
For the data analysis we chose the content analysis following Mayring (2015). 
The interviews were translated from Hindi or Nepali into English and transcribed 
afterwards. Field notes were taken in order to document other observations, focus 
group discussions and informal conversations. Following fieldwork, the texts 
were categorized and coded according to defined units of analysis, like formal 











 Participants of focus group 
discussions
Male  Female Male  Female Male  Female
India  13  1  24  3  35  17
 Total 14  Total 27  Total 52 (7 mixed FGD)
Nepal  14  2  25  10  18  9
 Total 16  Total 35  Total 27 (6 mixed FGD)
Total  30  62  13 FGDs
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and  informal institutions, types of actors and management mechanism. Finally, the 
results were interpreted, compared and discussed.
4. Results – development of yarshagumba governance systems
4.1. India: Kumaon Region, Uttarakhand State
The high alpine grasslands in the Kumaon Region are traditionally used as sum-
mer pastures and were never of great interest for the Indian state authorities 
(Gerwin and Bergmann 2012; Pandey et al. 2017). The State Forest Department 
hardly intervened in the local-level resource management systems for livestock 
grazing, although technically, all forests and grasslands in the Uttarakhand State 
are under their overall responsibility and supervision to manage and conserve the 
available resources (Singh 2016).
According to the current legislation4, the collection of NTFP in the wild is 
illegal in India. This regulation is valid for unclassified forests, state forests and 
protected areas, except within community forests under the management of van 
panchayats. The collection of NTFPs for personal use was never restricted, but 
the commercial collection and sale of the products was either prohibited (in the 
case of rare and endangered species) or permissible in van panchayats on the con-
dition that the harvested quantity would be sold via an auction system organised 
by the State Forest Department (Pauls and Franz 2013; Singh 2016).
Specifically with regards to yarshagumba collection, the State Forest Department 
formulated a government order in 2013 to regulate its collection and sale, which 
falls within the remit of van panchayats. The Government Order of Uttaranchal 
State (former name of Uttarakhand State) Forest Department 1790/18.1.2002 autho-
rised 20 van panchayats in Johar valley to hand out passes to community members 
for yarshagumba collection and provides regulations for sustainable collection and 
camp management.
The implementation of the Government Order has failed, however, because 
of the limited cooperation between the State Forest Department and local authori-
ties. The limited support and presence of officials in the remote sites makes it 
difficult for van panchayat leaders to manage the available resources in accord 
with the regulations. Further, through the high level of bureaucracy and lack of 
consultations before issuing new guidelines or directives, the local leaders felt 
their demands were not recognised and valued by the state authorities, as the fol-
lowing two statements of community members highlight:
4 Relevant national policies: The Forest Conservation Act 1980, the Wildlife Protection Act 1972 
with amendments in 1992, 2002, 2003 and 2005, the Scheduled Tribes and other Traditional Dwellers 
(Forest Right) Act 2006 and the Biological Diversity Act 2002 and Rules 2004; relevant state poli-
cies: Bhotia Grazing Rules 1927, Uttaranchal State Panchayati Forest Rules 2006. For more details 
about the Indian legislation related to NTFP and yarshagumba collection see Caplins (2016).
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There was a new directive that we [van panchayat leaders] have the permis-
sion to give out passes to villagers for collection of yarshagumba. But nobody 
was authorised to buy it directly. It did not make sense. They did not even 
consult us beforehand. (van panchayat leader in Munsyari, India, April 2017 
– English translation, original language Hindi)
I think, it [the policy] doesn’t matter. The foresters are not present on the 
ground anyway. For good management it needs strong community structures. 
(Community leader in Dharchula, India, January 2017 – English translation, 
original language Hindi)
De-facto, irrespective of policies and governmental regulations, people in the 
Kumaon region – including both community members and distant collectors – 
collect in all possible locations where yarshagumba can be found, and sell it 
through their own systems (Negi et al. 2016). See Annex 1 for some photographs 
of yarshagumba collection in the Kailash Landscape.
The governmental institutions are weak in controlling the collectors and 
resource extraction. However, the local communities have a strong interest in 
gaining or protecting access to sites where yarshagumba is found and limiting 
its collection. For that they have built up communal management arrangements 
specific to the conditions of each site. In the following we present different exam-
ples of management arrangements that have been set up by the communities and 
community-led organizations as a response to the rapid changes in the high alpine 
grasslands due to the high value of yarshagumba (refer also to Table 1 in Section 3 
for details about the key characteristics of each collection site in India and Nepal).
In Baling, upper Darma valley, the villagers are solely from the Rang/Shauka 
community and the local yarshagumba collection site lies with the boundaries of 
the van panchayat of Baling. The van panchayat plays a crucial role in regulating 
and managing the natural resources required on a daily basis by its community 
members. Their rights consist of excluding outsiders, extracting fodder and tim-
ber for personal usage, regulating grazing of livestock and formulating local man-
agement rules (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; Singh 2016). The communities make 
use of these rights to regulate yarshagumba collection by excluding distant users 
and only enabling collection for community members from that village (closed 
site). The van panchayat of Baling has limited the collection period and set rules 
for managing the campsites. Also on specific religious and cultural days collec-
tion is prohibited, as the statement of a community member describes:
On the next day is a puja [religious ceremony] in the village. So, all peo-
ple, who are up in the collection site will come down for that afternoon. Not 
everyone agrees to that, especially the youth, but there is no other option. 
(Community member from Baling, India, June 2017 – English translation, 
original language Hindi)
In contrast, another example shows that social norms and beliefs also change over 
time and some are not accepted by all community members anymore:
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All these mountains are sacred to the [Rang] people. One of these beliefs 
is that women, especially during their period but even in general, are not 
allowed to go to the high mountain areas. But nowadays people do not sup-
port that belief anymore. Women and children are also collecting. (Researcher 
C.S. Negi, Pithoragarh, India, August 2016)
Consequently, according to the interviewee, more community members – men, 
women and children – go for yarshagumba collection each year and the compe-
tition between collectors therefore increases. Although the economic impact of 
yarshagumba has influenced and in some cases transformed local traditions, the 
existence of common social norms and beliefs facilitates designing, enforcing and 
monitoring rules as well as sanctioning collectors for violations, as the rules are 
socially accepted by the whole community.
Other communal management arrangements for yarshagumba collection, like 
in Bona, Johar valley, are built on traditional grazing rights. For centuries, local 
institutions have effectively regulated the limited resources in the grazing grounds 
(Herrera et al. 2014). The grazing system included well-defined boundaries, pay-
ments for resource usage and graduated sanctions for violations, which has his-
torically ensured a sustainable usage of the limited resources (Negi et al. 2015). 
The same system is used to regulate the yarshagumba collection in Bona. The 
community has transferred traditional grazing rights to yarshagumba collection. 
Additionally, the community has designed rules limiting the collection period and 
area, as well as implemented entrance fees and fines for violations. They use the 
pre-established traditional systems and adapt them to the changing conditions.
In collection sites that are not within the official boundaries of van panchayats, 
but lie within state forests, or are not traditional grazing grounds, like in Tejum, lower 
Darma valley, local leaders negotiated access to a yarshagumba collection site with 
neighbouring communities as soon the run for yarshagumba collection started. Each 
community got access to one specific site. As the community leaders are socially 
accepted and respected by community members, these arrangements are legitimized 
in these communities, and therefore enforced. This has ensured that all nearby com-
munities have access to a site, which has reduced disputes and conflicts related to it.
In addition to the State Forest Department, new governmental actors for natu-
ral resource management have emerged on state and local levels in recent years: 
the State Biodiversity Board and Biodiversity Management Committees (BMCs). 
Comparing the rights and functions of the actors on village level, the functions of 
the BMC overlap with rights of the van panchayats, especially regarding the regu-
lation of access to resources by community members. The BMCs are legalised 
through the national Biodiversity Conservation Act (2002)5. So far 14 BMCs have 
5 The Biodiversity Conservation Act ensures that benefits derived from the utilization of biological re-
sources and associated knowledge by companies are shared with the claimer of the benefits including 
communities through the local BMC. Each BMC documents its biological and genetic resources and 
provides permits for each commercial sale of its resources (Uttarakhand Biodiversity Board 2017).
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been established in the region, but are not yet fully functional, nor fully socially 
accepted and integrated into the existing local natural resource governance sys-
tems. Currently, our data show that the van panchayats are more influential on 
local level, the van panchayat leaders are better recognised and their decisions 
and actions are legitimated by the community members. However, in the future, 
the van panchayats might be replaced by the BMCs in the communities, if BMCs 
receive more financial resources and governmental support and therefore accu-
mulate more authority and power.
4.2. Nepal: Api Nampa Conservation Area (ANCA), Darchula District
According to national policies in Nepal collection and sale of NTFPs including 
yarshagumba is legal, but the yearly total quantity of collected yarshagumba for 
a protected area is restricted by the Department of National Parks and Wildlife 
Conservation (DNPWC). In 2017, 690 kg was the fixed amount for ANCA (ANCA 
2018 unpublished). The ANCA authority collects royalties for yarshagumba col-
lection, which currently amounts to 25.000 NPR per kg (250 USD) (MoFSC 2015). 
Subsequently, ANCA makes approx. 17.3 Mio NPR (173.000 USD) in revenue per 
year only from yarshagumba collection.
Similar to India, in Nepal community-led organizations also play a key role in 
the management of high alpine grasslands. Since the 1990s, the Forest Department 
has handed over patches of government-owned forests surrounding the villages to 
communities who established community-forest user groups (CFUG) for the man-
agement of the forests. CFUGs are allowed to set up rules and regulations to man-
age their resources. They are allowed to restrict the number of users and the usage 
of resources, to collect fees for the extraction of timber and NTFPs and, in contrast 
to van panchayats in India, to sell their resources in the open market (Agrawal and 
Ostrom 2001).
In 2010, ANCA was established in Darchula District under the DNPWC. 
The establishment of ANCA and its community-led committees shifted most of 
the functions and rights of over 100 CFUGs in the area to newly formed ANCA 
Conservation Committees. The CFUGs were not dissolved, but new bodies were 
created and the ANCA office with its communal committees emerged as new 
player in the region. Some community members raised concerns in relation to 
these developments:
The establishment of the ANCA committees is a good progress, because 
people can raise their voice through the committees to officials in Darchula. 
But in the end all decisions are made in Darchula by committee leaders and 
ANCA, without any involvement of the community. (Community mem-
ber, Dumblin, Nepal, May 2017 – English translation, original language 
Nepali)
As this statement emphasizes, according to community members, the power rela-
tion has not changed much following the designation of ANCA, as in many local 
468 Corinna Wallrapp et al.
committees, community members have just switched ‘seats’ and power is still 
concentrated in the main town of Darchula.
The formation of ANCA has also altered the perception and legal status of 
access rights to resources for community members within ANCA. Yarshagumba is 
found in the five high mountain villages of Byash, Rapla, Khandeswori, Ghusa and 
Chitola. Before the ANCA was established, the CFUGs of these five villages both 
enabled and constrained the access to the yarshagumba collection sites. Nowadays, 
community members from all 21 villages within ANCA have the same rights under 
the umbrella of ANCA, according to ANCA policies. Therefore, members from 
lower villages should also have the same access rights to yarshagumba  collection 
sites and benefit from revenues in the same way as the five high mountain villages. 
Consequently, the five villages are reluctant to follow the new ANCA policies. 
The de-facto scenario is that in some sites, like in Api and Kuntison, communities 
still restrict access for members of other communities (closed sites). The sites Api 
and Kuntison lie within a community forest of the Shauka community and the 
communal arrangements are similar to the ones in Bona and Baling, India, like 
regulating access, fines and the collection period.
The collection site in Lolu, Chameylia valley, is different, as traditional graz-
ing and community forest management systems did not exist in the site before 
yarshagumba collection began. Additionally, the collectors coming to Lolu are 
from different communities and ethnic groups with different social norms. The 
enforcement of access rights and management regulations is challenging for the 
local community, as the ANCA Conservation Committee is not yet fully func-
tional and local arrangements are often not socially accepted by all collectors and 
therefore not followed. Conflicts are the consequence.
A locally developed guideline for the management of yarshagumba col-
lection in ANCA in 2016 tried to address these different conflicts and power 
struggles by negotiating rights and responsibilities between the local communi-
ties and distant collectors. The guideline increased the transparency regarding 
the rights and responsibilities of the ANCA Conservation Committees, clarified 
access, entrance fee collection and distribution of revenues and regulated the 
management of campsites. In the collection season of 2016, the committees in 
cooperation with ANCA authorities started its implementation. However, the 
higher authority, the DNPWC, did not approve this ANCA-specific guideline. 
Instead more general national directives for yarshagumba management in pro-
tected areas were developed in 2017 (MoFSC 2017). According to this latest 
national directive, it is the responsibility and right of the government authority 
in protected areas to control the access to yarshagumba collection sites, to dis-
tribute entrance permits, to collect entrance fees and to manage the campsites. 
This has shifted rights to control the access to the sites from local committees to 
government authorities without previous consultations and consideration of the 
local context. The ANCA government representatives appreciate these develop-
ments as emphasized by the quote:
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We think it is better that ANCA collects the entrance fees for the moment until 
the system works better. Than we can hand over to the community. (ANCA 
warden, Darchula, Nepal, May 2017 – English translation, original language 
Nepali)
In the protected area, these changes raised tensions between local leaders and 
governmental actors, hindered cooperation and hampered an effective implemen-
tation of the directives in the collection season of 2017.
Nevertheless, the partial implementation of both formalised guidelines, the 
local one in 2016 and the national one in 2017, has already improved the trans-
parency of fee collection and accountability through the involvement of a formal 
institution. Since 2016, each collector pays a fixed amount of 500 NPR (5 USD), 
1000 NPR (10 USD) or 3000 NPR (30 USD) depending on his/her origin (MoFSC 
2017). Beforehand, the collection of entrance fees from collectors was a very 
informal local arrangement made by the nearby communities. This sometimes led 
to threats, bribery and fraud as well as non-transparent usage of the collected fees 
(ICIMOD 2015). The guideline also sets up an equal distribution mechanism to 
all 21 communities within ANCA, but at the same time reduces the direct benefit 
for and the responsibility and customary rights of communities living next to the 
yarshagumba collection sites. A community representative of ANCA states his 
concerns about the latest developments:
I am not happy about the new directive. It is fine when ANCA [government 
authority] collects the money, but the responsibilities should be discussed and 
agreed between ANCA and the local committees. Monitoring will be difficult 
for ANCA. They are not in the sites. We can easily implement regulations. 
(ANCA Committee leader, Darchula, Nepal, May 2017 – English translation, 
original language Nepali)
As the statement shows, local leaders fear that management mechanisms in the 
collection sites cannot be sufficiently implemented by ANCA government author-
ities. They request cooperation and sharing of rights and responsibilities among 
the community-led organizations and government authorities in future for effec-
tive governance of yarshagumba collection.
5. Discussion – governance systems and their learning processes
Analysing the resource governance systems in different yarshagumba collection 
sites using the framework created by Pahl-Wostl (2009), our findings show that 
in both countries, the resource governance systems in high alpine grasslands have 
become more complex since yarshagumba collection started. Additional actors 
have appeared, power relations and interactions have changed, new institutions 
have been formed and others neglected. Some actors, like the distant collec-
tor, have emerged directly due to the rapidly increasing value of yarshagumba. 
Other actors and related institutions, like ANCA in Nepal, or the BMC in India, 
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 developed due to decisions and policy changes on national and state levels for 
natural resource management. All actors have an interest in benefitting from the 
increased resource value and, therefore, have influenced the governance systems 
in the high alpine grasslands. Further, all actors and institutions interact on mul-
tiple levels, but hardly harmonize or complement each other. Bureaucratic hierar-
chy is still the predominant governance mode in both countries.
In both countries, several institutional and societal multi-level learning pro-
cesses were initiated, which altered the structures of existing resource governance 
systems and consequently triggered new learning processes. In the early years of 
the 2000s when the ‘gold rush’ started, communities set up access and manage-
ment rules. This can be identified as single-loop learning that changed actions to 
improve established routines (Pahl-Wostl 2009). In some cases these rules solved 
conflicts between collectors and clarified terms of resource extraction; in other 
cases they raised more tensions. We identify four practices of communities to 
legitimate these arrangements in our case study: transfer of formal institutions 
from one resource to another one (example: Baling), consistent strong leadership 
of community heads (example: Tejum), maintenance of a shared sense of commu-
nity in a site (examples: Baling and Api) and retention of established customary 
rights and responsibilities (example: Bona). The arrangements have enabled these 
communities to retain most benefits for their own community and to control users 
and resource extraction when the design of governmental institutions is weak, as 
is the case in India, or when the governmental institutions override customary 
rights and practices, as it is the case in Nepal.
These established communal management arrangements are not necessarily 
legally sanctioned by law, especially in India. They are recognized as legitimate 
by the involved community members (c.f. Scott 1999). However in some cases, 
communities have difficulties to enforce these informal regulations, especially 
towards distant collectors. Distant collectors often do not know or neglect these 
informal arrangements and, therefore, do not legitimate them. Additionally, mem-
bers from within the community are not always willing to respect certain tradi-
tions, as the example of women collecting yarshagumba shows. By comparing 
the dynamics in the different sites, we deduce that the more the local site arrange-
ments are linked to formal community-led organizations, like van panchayats in 
India or CFUG and the ANCA Conservation Committees in Nepal, the more the 
collection of yarshagumba is regulated and the better regulations can be enforced 
by the community under both community members and distant collectors.
In India, the State Forest Department is characterised by strong bureaucratic 
hierarchies and limited interaction with local leaders (Singh 2016). On the one 
hand, the remoteness and inaccessibility of the collection sites as well as the lim-
ited human and financial resources of the State Forest Department hamper the 
implementation of the existing polices. On the other hand, government authori-
ties have not yet responded to the changing situation in the high alpine grasslands 
with major policy revisions. Although local representatives of the State Forest 
Department are aware of their limitations and have an interest in further legalising 
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the collection and sale of yarshagumba in order to collect revenues and control the 
access to the resource, at the time of writing, the decision about legalisation was 
still pending on state level.
On local and national levels, the Nepali government has responded to the 
yarshagumba ‘gold rush’ only recently, when conflicts between actors increased. 
The local yarshagumba management guidelines for ANCA developed in 2016 
were an attempt to involve state and non-state actors on a local level equally to 
negotiate and share rights and responsibilities, as well as to increase their overall 
cooperation. However, it lacked the acceptance of higher government authorities 
on the central level. The formulation of national directives a year later shows 
that although decentralised community-based programmes have been part of 
 government schemes since the late 1990s (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001), power 
and decision-making is still situated on national level. Therefore, the vertical 
integration between local and national actors and institutions remains weak. 
Nevertheless, the local 2016 yarshagumba management guideline for ANCA pro-
vides a good example of revising the institutional frame of the governance system 
by integrating informal and innovative approaches as well as local knowledge of 
communities in formal processes. This approach linked the single-loop learning 
process (improvements of local actions) with double-loop learning (revisions of 
the governance frame).
Referring to triple-loop learning (Pahl-Wostl 2009), to date, neither state 
nor non-state actors in India and Nepal are tackling the communities’ strong 
dependency on yarshagumba collection. Governmental programmes could pro-
vide incentives to reduce the communities’ dependency on NTFP collection and 
to identify comparable income options to reduce the pressure on these natural 
resources. This could transform the overall socio-economic context in the high 
Himalayan Mountains and would contribute towards greater sustainability of 
natural resources.
Subsequently, referring to our hypothesis, our findings show that in compari-
son to government authorities, communities adapted more flexibly to protect or 
gain access to a common pool resource when the value of this resource increased. 
Irrespective of the legal status of yarshagumba collection, the resource governance 
systems in both countries in our case study have adapted to the abrupt changes 
in the high alpine grasslands. The pressures on this resource triggered innovative 
approaches on a community level to protect or gain access to collection sites. 
Following the example in Nepal, the establishment of communal management 
arrangements needs to be followed by and strongly linked with the revision and 
implementation of governmental institutions. This can stabilize and legitimate the 
adaptive changes in the governance systems, especially when the communities 
respond in ways that fall outside the bounds of formal institutions.
Going beyond this case study, we elaborate that stages of multi-level learning 
have to build on each other to be able to move from changing actions (single-loop 
learning) to revising the frame by government authorities with the cooperation 
of communities (double-loop learning) and, finally, to transforming the context 
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(triple-loop learning). Therefore, we argue that institutionally-mixed resource 
governance systems constituted by multi-level interaction as well as shared 
responsibilities and rights among different institutions and actors can better 
handle sudden resource value changes and other changes triggered subsequently 
by enabling adaptive and transformative learning processes in the governance 
systems.
Currently, the limited recognition of the local context in recent policies in 
India and Nepal, as well as the overlapping of institutional rights, such as for 
van panchayats and BMCs in India and ANCA Conservation committees and 
CFUGs in Nepal, has led to limited vertical and horizontal integration between 
state and non-state actors. This could become even more severe in Nepal when the 
newly established administrative units, gaun palikas (villages) and nagar palikas 
(municipalities), empowered through the new Nepal Constitution of September 
2015, demand their rights to manage natural resources at the local level. This 
will most likely bring a new dynamic into the existing governance structure with 
outcomes, which so far cannot be predicted. A similar situation could occur in 
India once BMCs on local level and the State Biodiversity Board receive more 
human and financial resources and become more strongly socially accepted. As 
yarshagumba is currently the local resource with the highest value found in the 
Himalayan Mountains (Negi et al. 2016), struggles on state and local level between 
State Forest Department and State Biodiversity Board to benefit from the resource 
are likely. However, the new situations in Nepal and India can also provide oppor-
tunities to reflect on general questions about equity, power and authority, resource 
distribution and livelihood dependencies in the context of NTFP collection and 
sale in remote mountain villages to encourage transformative change.
6. Conclusion
Our comparative case study reveals communities’ and governments’ capacities 
to adapt to resource value changes in the high alpine grasslands of the Kailash 
Landscape. We conclude that neither government nor communities alone can 
ensure effective governance in remote mountain areas when resource values 
rapidly increase. During learning processes the link between the amendment of 
actions (single-loop learning), in our case initiated by communities, and the revi-
sion of the formal policies and the frame (double-loop learning) is essential to 
ensure that innovative approaches reach the policy level (vertical integration) 
and can spread across administrative boundaries (horizontal interaction). A com-
plex and complementary resource governance system consisting of governmen-
tal institutions and communal management arrangements is required to adapt 
adequately and to ensure that learning processes are innovative, context-specific, 
legally sanctioned and enforced.
Building on this insight we conclude that other common pool resources in the 
Himalayas face similar governance challenges. For example demand and prices 
for medicinal and aromatic plants have increased over the last decades (Pauls and 
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Franz 2013). The majority of them, just like yarshagumba, are not cultivated, but 
harvested wild in remote areas by communities (Uprety et al. 2016). Referring to 
our findings, this will most likely trigger similar power struggles, adaptation and 
learning processes.
We recommend that the affected regions establish common platforms for 
actors from different levels and sectors, including the government, relevant 
research facilities and communities. Joint meetings could encourage exchange 
and understanding, create awareness and provide the opportunity to share local 
and scientific knowledge among relevant actors. This would also close the gap 
between the communal and governmental efforts for adaption and encourage 
transformation towards sustainable resource management. 
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Annex 1
Picture 1: Collectors with camping luggage (June 2017).
Picture 2: Collectors searching for yarshagumba (May 2017).
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Picture 4: Campsite of collectors (May 2017).
Picture 3: Yarshagumba when collected (May 2017).
